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Abstract 
 
This article examines the problem of how to interpret competing, clashing or 
contradictory news frames in coverage of war and conflict, focusing on the reporting 
of the 1992—95 Bosnian war. ‘Ethnic war’ and ‘genocide’ featured as competing 
news frames in news coverage of Bosnia and several subsequent conflicts, and are 
often understood to be contradictory in terms of their implied explanations, moral 
evaluations and policy prescriptions. The article questions the assumptions that 
many journalists and academics have made about these frames and the relationship 
between them. It asks how we can make sense of clashing or contradictory scholarly 
analyses of these competing frames, and considers a number of broader issues for 
framing analysis: the significance of historical context for understanding the meaning 
of particular framing devices, the importance of quantification in framing analysis, 
and the role of influential sources in prompting journalists to adopt particular frames. 
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‘Ethnic war’ and ‘genocide’ have featured as competing news frames in Western 
news coverage of several conflicts in the post-Cold War era. These two frames, and 
the contrasts between them, first became a topic of controversy in the 1990s, but 
have continued to appear in news coverage of conflict to the present day. Reporting 
violence in Myanmar in 2017, involving attacks on the Rohingya Muslim minority and 
an ensuing refugee exodus to neighbouring Bangladesh, for example, Newsweek 
described the situation as ‘genocide’ and (quoting a United Nations official) as a 
‘textbook case of ethnic cleansing’ (Haltiwanger 2017). The Washington Post, in 
contrast, reported the same events as ‘intercommunal violence’ in ‘a state prone to 
religious and ethnic conflict’ (Freeman 2017). A decade earlier, campaigning 
American press coverage of Darfur characterised the conflict there in terms of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and ‘genocide’, as well as perpetuating misleading ideas about conflict 
arising naturally from ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ differences between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’ 
(Mamdani 2007). 
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This article examines the problem of how to interpret competing, clashing or 
contradictory news frames in coverage of war and conflict, focusing on the reporting 
of the 1992—95 Bosnian war. The first section below briefly summarises this context, 
in order to indicate what is at stake in this debate. The main focus of the article, 
though – in keeping with the theme of this special issue – is on methodological 
issues. It therefore also asks how we can make sense of clashing or contradictory 
scholarly analyses of these competing frames, and in so doing, considers a number 
of broader issues for framing analysis: the significance of historical context for 
understanding the meaning of particular framing devices, the importance of 
quantification in framing analysis, and the role of influential sources in prompting 
journalists to adopt particular frames. Although there is a high level of agreement 
among scholars regarding the concept of ‘framing’ (as suggested by the near-
universal acknowledgement of Robert Entman’s (1993) influential attempt to clarify 
the concept), in practice researchers can diverge markedly in how they actually 
conduct framing analyses. Sometimes investigations of news frames are largely or 
even entirely qualitative, and lack any quantitative dimension; while others are 
difficult to distinguish from a standard quantitative content analysis. Without wishing 
to be overly prescriptive, it is suggested here that a framing analysis generally ought 
to involve both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. 
 
 
‘Ethnic war’ and ‘genocide’ as competing news frames 
 
These two news frames are often understood to be contradictory in terms of the 
implied explanation of conflict that each offers – seeing violence as arising from a 
two- (or more) sided antagonism based on ethnic or ‘tribal’ differences, or as a one-
sided campaign of expulsion and/or extermination; as a more or less spontaneous, 
bottom-up eruption of mutual hostility, or as a systematic, top-down operation 
targeting a minority group. These different explanatory framings are in turn often 
thought to imply different moral evaluations and different responses or policy 
prescriptions. ‘Ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ conflicts might more readily be understood to involve 
distributed blame, to be seen as complex and intractable (based on ‘ancient hatreds’, 
for example), and to invite an arms-length response from the international 
community, perhaps at most involving peacekeeping operations to separate warring 
factions and/or diplomatic efforts at mediation. Conversely, if violence is understood 
as ‘genocide’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’, it would demand not only a clear-cut attribution of 
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blame to one ‘side’ but also a more interventionist response, to rescue victims and 
punish the victimisers. 
 
There is a widely-held, but highly questionable, idea that the consensus about 
Bosnia at the time was that it was an ethnic conflict, but that it should have been 
understood, as it eventually was, as a one-sided war of aggression by the Serbs. 
Reflecting on his experience of covering Bosnia for the BBC, for example, Allan Little 
describes how he was ‘bewildered’ by what seemed to be the general consensus 
about the war: 
 
That the Balkan tribes had been killing each other for centuries and that there 
was nothing that could be done. It was nobody’s fault. It was just, somehow, 
the nature of the region. It was a lie that Western governments at that time 
liked. It got the Western world off the hook. When I and others argued that 
you could not blame all sides equally, the moral implications were that the 
world should – as it later did – take sides. 
(Little 2001)1 
 
For Little, this ‘ethnic’ framing is wrong in three senses: it misrepresents the conflict 
as the inevitable and intractable outcome of Balkan history and culture; this false 
view then supports a mistaken moral judgement, failing properly to apportion blame 
for the violence; and this in turn then facilitates a weak and cowardly response from 
Western powers. Little was far from alone in seeking to put forward an alternative to 
this perceived consensus. Washington Post journalist Mary Battiata, for example, 
argued that ‘There was only one story – a war of aggression against a largely 
defenseless, multi-ethnic population. It was very simple’. Similarly, CNN’s Christiane 
Amanpour maintained that: ‘sometimes in life, there are clear examples of black and 
white...I think during the three-and-a-half-year war in Bosnia, there was a clear 
aggressor and clear victim’ (both quoted in Ricchiardi 1996). In addition to agreeing 
over the morally simple, black-and-white nature of the conflict, many also drew the 
same pro-interventionist conclusions as Little. Amanpour confronted President 
Clinton on live television in May 1994 for failing to articulate a tough policy on Bosnia 
(Ricchiardi 1996), for example; while the BBC’s Martin Bell elaborated the view that 
journalists should abandon traditional ideas about objectivity2 and should refuse to 
‘stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the 
oppressor’ (Bell 1998: 16). As Alison Preston (1996: 113) notes, this style of 
reporting – what Bell called the ‘journalism of attachment’ – is ‘intrinsically bound to a 
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wish to proselytise’, and entails a deliberate effort to ‘signal the extent of their 
commitment’. 
 
There is of course a legitimate critique to be made of ‘ethnic war’ framings. The main 
problem with such accounts is that they take for granted that which they purport to 
explain: the mere fact of ethnic differences is seen as itself inevitably giving rise to 
conflict. Moreover, as Michael Ignatieff (1998: 56) notes, the term ‘ethnicity’ is often 
used as if it were a fixed biological category. Rather than seeing conflict as the 
inevitable, and essentially inexplicable, result of quasi-natural differences, 
commentators such as Ignatieff have instead emphasised the ‘plasticity’ of identity, 
arguing that, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, professed cultural divisions were 
often inauthentic and manufactured. Instead of treating ethnicity as a given which 
causes conflict, Ignatieff suggests that an exclusivist politics of identity was 
deliberately encouraged and manipulated by local political leaders and the media. 
While this critique of ‘ethnic’ explanations is persuasive, however, it is not an 
innocent one: it is usually tied to an argument about the necessity for Western 
governments to adopt a more interventionist foreign policy. Ignatieff’s (1998: 98) 
complaint is that seeing the world as chaotic and riven by ethnic conflict means that 
there is no ‘rationale for intervention and long-term ethical engagement’. Similarly, 
Mary Kaldor (1999: 147) rejects ‘essentialist assumptions about culture’ because 
they work against the operation of ‘authority at a global level’. 
 
It goes without saying that scholars are free to adopt whatever normative position 
they wish on foreign policy questions, but one might expect that academic critics 
would be sceptical of the rather self-flattering role that many reporters imagined for 
themselves in Bosnia, as brave advocates of muscular Western intervention, 
attempting to challenge the received wisdom about the war and put pressure on 
pusillanimous governments. Yet Little’s view is echoed in scholarly accounts of the 
war’s media treatment. David Keen, for example, argues that ‘ethnic war’ framings 
encourage a ‘culture of disempowerment’ in Western countries, in the sense that if 
‘the causes of wars…remain poorly understood, it may be relatively easy for some 
analysts…to insist that a proper response is an isolationist one’ (1999: 81–82). 
Similarly, Jean Seaton (1999: 49) maintains that a ‘mood of fatalism among many 
contemporary political leaders’ is sustained by the ‘notion that conflicts are caused by 
primitive ethnic identification’. 
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Of particular interest for this discussion is Gregory Kent’s major framing study of 
media coverage of Bosnia, discussed in more detail below. Kent finds – in line with 
Little’s description of the ‘consensus’ about the war – that coverage was 
characterised by what he calls a ‘Balkanist perspective’: 
 
the idea that the war in Bosnia was the result of ethnic hatred between the 
three main ethnic groupings was an explicit and dominant frame of the 
coverage in the opening months of the war; it instantiated moral equalisation 
between Bosnian and Serbian forces. 
(Kent 2006: 255) 
 
Journalists’ adoption of this ethnic frame is wrong, he argues, because it allowed or 
encouraged inaction on the part of Western governments. Instead, Kent contends, 
using the ‘appropriate’ frame would have put pressure on states to ‘take a stand’: 
 
genocide was an appropriate international framing of what was being done 
and…the use of the term ‘genocide’ by British news organisations would have 
had a great potential impact on the state’s policy toward the war. Such 
definition and recognition of genocide would have placed clear legal duties on 
Western states generally to take preventive action. 
(Kent 2006: 8) 
 
Clearly, both for journalists and critics, much is at stake in this debate: reporters 
adopting the ‘right’ frame is seen as vitally important if genocide is to be recognised 
and averted by Western governments. 
 
Given the often-repeated claim that an ‘ethnic’ framing of the war was endorsed by 
Western politicians, and only shifted when challenged by committed reporters, I was 
surprised to find in my own study of media coverage of Bosnia that, to the contrary, 
an understanding of the conflict as a one-sided, aggressive war waged by the Serbs 
was reported right from the start as the view of numerous influential sources (see 
further Hammond, 2007). In April 1992 the Guardian reported that the US 
government might sever diplomatic relations with Belgrade ‘to emphasise its 
opposition to what it regards as Serbian aggression against Bosnia’ (21 April 1992); 
that Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic had been ‘identified by the US, Germany and 
others…as the prime culprit’ (24 April); and that the US was ‘leading the [verbal] 
attacks on Belgrade’ (25 April). The Independent said that Bosnian President Alija 
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Izetbegovic’s claim that ‘Bosnia is the victim of classic aggression from outside’ was 
‘backed by several foreign governments, including the United States, Germany and 
Austria’ (15 April 1992); that State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler had 
‘singled out by name President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and federal army 
leaders as the chief culprits behind Bosnia’s violence’ (16 April); that the European 
Community (EC) and the US ‘agree in holding the Serbs responsible for the fighting’ 
(22 April); and that German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had ‘described 
Serbia as “the aggressor” in the Bosnian conflict’ (24 April). The Times reported that 
the British Foreign Office had ‘said Serb paramilitary units bore the main 
responsibility for bloodshed and…deplored the activities of the federal army, 
which…had openly sided with terrorists’ (17 April 1992); and that the EC’s special 
envoy Lord Peter Carrington had said ‘that the Serbs and the army were largely to 
blame for the violence’ (22 April). 
 
The idea that Serbian aggression was the cause of the war was not only widely 
articulated by several influential sources in the very first month of the conflict: it was 
also immediately taken up by journalists themselves, who reproduced it in news 
reports and explicitly endorsed it in editorial columns. Arguing that ‘The root of the 
problem lies in Belgrade’, the Guardian’s editorial position was that Bosnia was an 
‘innocent multi-racial [sic] victim of Serbian malevolence’ (13 April 1992). The 
Independent acknowledged that the Croats ‘do not have wholly clean hands’, but 
said that the Serbs had ‘started the fighting’ and suggested that more governments 
should be ‘pressured into recognising that this is now a case of international 
aggression’ (24 April 1992). According to the Times (23 April 1992), the ‘pattern of 
Serbian expansionism in Croatia’ was now ‘being repeated on a potentially far 
bloodier scale’ and the ‘Serbian offensive’ was ‘nothing less than the invasion of an 
independent country’. These statements from editorial columns, taken together with 
the reported views of official sources, suggest that a powerful consensus was 
established quickly at the beginning of the war regarding how it was to be 
understood. In the news pages, the Independent’s East Europe editor, Tony Barber, 
argued that ‘Conquest is a national crusade for Belgrade’ (17 April 1992), for 
example; a view reiterated by Anne McElvoy in the Times the following day in an 
article headlined ‘Serb crusaders brush aside final warnings’ (18 April 1992). The 
Guardian’s East Europe correspondent, Ian Traynor, also took up the ‘crusade’ 
theme, suggesting that ‘Serbians view Bosnia as the front line in a new holy war’ (16 
April 1992). Traynor explained the war as ‘an increasingly aggressive Serbian 
campaign to take control of coveted territory and drive Muslims or Croats out’ (6 April 
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1992), and as a ‘land grab campaign to dismember the newly independent state of 
Bosnia’ (16 April). He acknowledged that ‘radical Croats’ were ‘probably’ also ‘bent 
on unravelling Bosnia’s complex weave of interlocking and intermingled communities’ 
(13 April 1992), but identified Milosevic as ‘the main villain of the piece’ (25 April). 
Such reports indicate that an interpretation of the conflict as a largely one-sided war 
of Serbian aggression was shared by journalists rather than only reported as the 
view of sources. 
 
These findings are clearly at odds with the conventional story of how the British and 
other Western media framed the Bosnian war. It may therefore be useful at this point 
to examine how the evidence has to be handled in order to allow that conventional 
story still to get told. 
 
 
Methodological differences 
 
Kent (2006: 310—11) found that two frames – which he dubs the ‘Balkanist or moral 
equalisation’ frame and the ‘Serbian aggression’ frame – were the most dominant 
(indeed, he does not mention the existence of any others). He found that the first one 
was present, wholly or partly, overtly or implicitly, in ‘every single report’ (2006: 310). 
Kent arrived at this finding by taking any mention of terms such as ‘the Serbs’, ‘the 
Croats’ or ‘the Muslims’ as indicators of the ‘Balkanist’ frame (2006: 310), though it is 
difficult to imagine how reporters could have avoided such terms altogether. Instead, 
he suggests, journalists should have used phrases such as ‘Serb Bosnians’ or ‘Croat 
Bosnians’ which, he argues, emphasise shared ‘Bosnian-ness’ rather than ethnic 
differences (2006: 70). This, is must be said, is somewhat idiosyncratic: the terms 
‘Serb Bosnians’ and ‘Croat Bosnians’ were rarely used at the time because the 
people to whom such terms would have been attached did not, on the whole, identify 
with the breakaway Bosnian state. Quite the reverse: they contested and rejected the 
formation of such a state, seeking instead either to break away in turn and/or to 
attach themselves to larger entities such as the remaining Yugoslav state or the 
newly-independent Croatia. In this context, emphasising the ‘Bosnian-ness’ of people 
who had little or no sense of affiliation with the Bosnian state would have been 
nonsensical and tendentious. It would have made no more sense than describing 
secessionists in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 as ‘Slovenian Yugoslavs’ and ‘Croatian 
Yugoslavs’. 
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More significantly, it is doubtful whether the use of labels such as ‘Bosnian Serbs’ or 
‘Bosnian Croats’ implies an understanding of the war as essentially an ethnic conflict, 
in a way that terms such as ‘Serb Bosnians’ and ‘Croat Bosnians’ might not. If one 
were to adopt Kent’s approach, not only every report from Bosnia, but just about any 
report from any conflict anywhere could be understood as an example of ‘ethnic’ 
framing. Yet to say that ‘the British’ fought ‘the Germans’ in the Second World War 
does not imply that the conflict was caused by ethnic differences. It seems likely that 
Kent failed to discover evidence to support his presupposition that the media must 
have framed Bosnia as an ‘ethnic conflict’, and so resorted to the doubtful measure 
of assuming that if reports mentioned ‘Serbs’ and ‘Croats’ this must be evidence of 
‘Balkanism’. This raises a familiar problem of content analysis, whereby if the 
categories of analysis are determined in advance, the danger is that data will then 
simply be sliced in such a way as to confirm the researcher’s initial hypothesis. The 
potential advantage of framing analysis – that quantifiable textual features are 
derived from close contextual qualitative analysis of data – is thereby lost. 
 
As well as pointing up the problems that can arise from prejudging analytical 
categories rather than developing them from close qualitative analysis, Kent’s study 
also illustrates very well the importance of the quantitative dimension of framing 
analysis. Having found ‘Balkanist’ ethnic war framing in ‘every single report’, Kent 
also found that the ‘Serbian aggression’ frame featured in ‘many but by no means all 
reports’ (2006: 311, original emphasis). Unfortunately, he does not disclose how 
many constitutes ‘many but by no means all’. Instead of quantifying his findings, Kent 
gives brief examples and explains that such illustrations are to be read as indicating 
that ‘there was at least one and usually more examples of this feature, but…rarely 
more than five examples’ (2006: 447, n75). Such a formula makes it very difficult to 
assess the weight of the examples he does choose, and produces a rather hazy 
picture of the overall patterns of coverage. Possibly this is because a clear 
quantitative measure of the extent of ‘Serbian aggression’ framing would have 
undermined the conclusion that the dominant theme was ‘ethnic conflict’: these are 
logically ‘mutually exclusive frames’ (2006: 9). In trying to square the circle, Kent 
resorts to the argument that ‘the Serbian aggression frame…implicitly supported the 
Balkanist contention that the “different sides” could not live together and there had to 
be war between them’ (2006: 311). Hence, despite finding the ‘Serbian aggression’ 
frame to be the second most common, Kent nevertheless complains of ‘a journalistic 
aversion to attribution of responsibility’ (2006: 312). Black, in other words, is white: 
blaming one side is the same as not blaming anyone. Such contortions become 
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necessary because of a twin methodological failure: a failure to derive analytical 
categories from close qualitative analysis; and a failure properly to quantify findings. 
 
A clear illustration of these problems is provided by Kent’s discussion of a term that 
first rose to prominence in the reporting of Bosnia and has since entered into 
common usage: ‘ethnic cleansing’. He argues that: 
 
It reinforced the framing as ethnic war not only because it included the word 
‘ethnic’ but also because of the vague definition of the term – apparently 
meaning, in the early stages of its use, different things to different journalists 
– it chimed well with the overarching theme of incomprehensible ethnic war. 
(2006: 255) 
 
Kent also argues that the phrase was used as a way of avoiding the term ‘genocide’, 
which in his view would have been much more appropriate. In principle, these may 
seem like logical conclusions to draw: reports of ‘ethnic cleansing’ might well be 
thought to imply an ‘ethnic conflict’ framing, and be seen as a euphemistic way of 
avoiding the term genocide. Yet from my analysis, the coverage of the war supports 
very different conclusions. 
 
Firstly, a quantitative survey of the coverage indicates differences in usage of the 
term as applied to different perpetrators. I looked at coverage of the war in four UK 
national dailies (the Guardian, Independent, Daily Mail and Times), over four four-
week periods between 1992—95, resulting in a sample of 999 articles.3 Of these, 162 
mentioned ‘ethnic cleansing’, with over 70% of articles identifying this as something 
carried out by Serbs (116 out of 162 articles). ‘Ethnic cleansing’ by Croats (25 
articles) and by Bosnian Muslims (8 articles) was mentioned far less frequently (13 
articles did not specify a perpetrator). The fact that the term was used much more 
frequently to describe the actions of the Serbs suggests that this phrase was not 
used as part of an ‘ethnic war’ frame which implied ‘moral equalisation’. It is also 
notable that while (Bosnian) Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces were sometimes said 
to be engaged in ‘ethnic cleansing’, their actions were never discussed in terms of 
genocide, whereas of the 41 articles mentioning ‘genocide’ in the samples of 
coverage I examined, 90% named the Serbs as the perpetrators (37 of 41 articles: 
the remaining four did not specify a perpetrator). Again, this does not indicate any 
kind of ‘moral equalisation’ in the way the violence was framed. 
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Secondly, in terms of contextual qualitative interpretation, while the term ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ was indeed used in different ways it is nevertheless possible to discern 
quite consistent patterns of usage. Where the term was elaborated or described, 
striking differences emerged which depended less on which journalist was using the 
term than on who was identified as the perpetrator. In articles reporting ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ carried out by Serbs, qualifying terms such as ‘policy’, ‘plan’, ‘aim’, 
‘objective’, ‘goal’, ‘systematic’, ‘campaign’ and ‘strategy’ were used to suggest the 
consistent pursuit of a deliberate policy. While similar terminology was sometimes 
used in news reports of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Croats and Muslims, more often their 
actions were described differently. Here, rather than a conscious policy or strategy, 
‘ethnic cleansing’ was described using terms such as ‘insanity’, ‘frenzy’, ‘crazy’ and 
‘epidemic’, suggesting irrationality or illness; or else it was explained as mutual 
recrimination (as ‘tit-for-tat cleansing’, or as an attempt to ‘exact revenge’). It was 
occasionally argued that the behaviour of all sides was similar, as when Conor 
Cruise O’Brien said that ‘ethnic cleansing is not just a Serbian idea [but] a fancy 
recent label for standard practice in a Balkan civil war’ (Independent, 23 April 1993). 
More often, however, it was suggested that ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Serbs possessed ‘a 
quality…which is fundamentally different’ (Mail, 18 April 1993). So in the case of the 
Serbs, ‘systematic ethnic cleansing was the aim…not an incidental by-product of the 
fighting’ (Times, 9 November 1995); whereas for actions by Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims there was said to be ‘[no] proof of “orchestrated mass killings”’ (Guardian, 
21 April 1993). The latter quotation is from a report by Ian Traynor on ‘ethnic 
slaughter around Vitez’ by Muslims and Croats, which acknowledged that the Serbs 
were ‘not involved this time’ but still managed to depict ‘ethnic cleansing’ as an 
essentially Serbian practice by describing them as the ‘architects’ of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’. Looking back at the end of the war, Traynor also recalled these events in 
terms of the Croats having ‘aped Serb tactics’ (Guardian, 21 November 1995). 
 
In the samples of news coverage I examined, ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Bosnian Muslims 
was said to part of a strategic ‘plan’ only once, when this view was attributed to a 
spokesman for the Croatian Defence Council (Independent, 2 April 1993). ‘Ethnic 
cleansing’ by Croats was sometimes explicitly linked to strategic policy goals, as a 
‘cold-blooded…strategy’ involving an attempt to ‘establish [an] ethnically pure mini-
state’ or to ‘ethnically [purify]’ their territory, for example, but almost all examples of 
this were in reports from 1995 when the war was over. The only exception was an 
article by Tim Judah in the Times (15 April 1993) reporting the view of a ‘senior UN 
official’ that a double standard was being applied to Serbs and Croats. Judah noted 
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that the existence of a ‘Zagreb-controlled puppet state’ in Bosnia was ‘regularly 
ignored’ and, even more unusually, wrote that it ‘permits no dissent from its Muslim 
minority and its Serbs have been “ethnically cleansed” or killed’. This was 
exceptional because Serbs were almost never said to be the victims of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, even when they clearly were. Retrospective accounts of the war in 1995, 
for example, often mentioned ‘Operation Storm’, the US-backed Croatian offensive 
against Serbs in the Krajina region, but there was disagreement over whether this 
could be described as ‘ethnic cleansing’. A commentary by Michael Ignatieff in the 
Independent (22 November 1995) candidly stated that US ‘permission to drive the 
Serbs from Krajina’ amounted to American ‘ratification of Croatian ethnic cleansing’. 
In the Mail (23 November 1995), Mark Almond obscured the issue by arguing that 
‘the return of refugees usually leads to a renewed wave of ethnic cleansing as the 
defeated flee possible revenge (as happened in the Krajina in August when the 
Croats turned the tables on the Serbs)’. Here, the violent expulsion of Serbs by the 
Croatian military is portrayed as a flight, prompted by returning refugees, from the 
mere possibility of ‘revenge’. In other cases, reporters seemed to go out of their way 
to avoid describing Croatian actions against Serbs as ‘ethnic cleansing’. In the Times 
(24 November 1995), for example, Michael Binyon noted ‘the expulsion of Serbs 
from Krajina’, but described Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević as the 
‘mastermind of “ethnic cleansing”’. More pointedly, the Independent’s Tony Barber 
wrote that the Serbian community in the Krajina had been ‘ruined by its armed revolt 
against Zagreb and by Croatia’s military revenge last August, which triggered the 
flight or expulsion of more than 150,000 Serbs’ (18 November 1995). While the 
Bosnian Muslims were said to have been victims of ‘savage “ethnic cleansing”’, the 
Serbs had only brought ‘ruin’ on themselves by provoking ‘revenge’. 
 
A qualitative investigation of the coverage, then, suggests that the use of the term 
‘ethnic cleansing’ cannot be assumed to have supported a ‘Balkanist’, ‘ethnic war’ or 
‘moral equalisation’ frame. Quite the reverse: the term was used differentially in a 
way that reinforced the opposite understanding of the war, which blamed it on 
Serbian aggression. The final piece of the picture is supplied if we compare the 
pattern of journalists’ use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the views of influential 
sources. In terms of quantitative patterns, it is notable that there was a sharp rise in 
journalists’ use of the phrase after Assistant Secretary of State Margaret Tutwiler 
mentioned it in a 14 May 1992 press briefing. 4  In the four UK newspapers I 
examined, there were a total of 560 items mentioning the term in 1992: one 
published before 14 May (a letter to the Independent (20 April 1992) from a 
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representative of the Croatian Aid Organisation), and 559 afterwards. It is also 
significant that the intention of those in the US State Department introducing the term 
was not to engage in ‘moral equalisation’ but precisely to elicit sympathy for the 
Bosnian Muslims. The previous month, Bosnian Muslim Foreign Minister Haris 
Silajdžić, had met with Secretary of State James Baker, who in turn asked Tutwiler to 
speak to Silajdžić about ‘the importance of using Western mass media to build 
support in Europe and North America for the Bosnian cause’ (Baker 1995: 643–4). 
Tutwiler herself was reputedly already sympathetic to this cause (Neuman 1996: 
236), and certainly the official who wrote the phrase ‘ethnic cleansing’ into her press 
briefing, George Kenney, was keen to encourage greater US involvement in the 
Balkans. 
 
The differential application of the term in media coverage then mirrored the views of 
official sources, although this agreement appears to have been mutually-reinforcing. 
The UN Security Council established a Commission of Experts in 1992, to investigate 
war crimes in Bosnia, and specifically directed it to examine ‘ethnic cleansing’. The 
Commission explicitly rejected any ‘moral equivalence’ argument and said that while 
all sides had committed ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions, ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ by Serbs was different because it was ‘the result of a highly-developed 
policy’ (UN Commission of Experts 1994: 21). As discussed above, press usage of 
the term was broadly in line with this official view but it is not clear who followed 
whose usage: one would expect journalists to have picked up the language of official 
sources, but the latter also seem to have been influenced by media reports. In the 
section of the Commission’s report dealing with ‘Assigning Responsibility for “Ethnic 
Cleansing”’ (1994: 32–6), for example, the majority of the sources cited are news 
reports. 
 
Certainly in the final stages of the war, the media were perfectly in tune with official 
sources in efforts to minimise the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Serbs from Croatia in 
Operation Storm in August 1995. This is remembered in some quarters as ‘the 
biggest single instance of ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav Wars’ (Malic 2015), yet at 
the time, as noted above, Western journalists were reluctant to acknowledge that the 
assault – which drove over 200,000 Serbs out of the country, killing around 2,000 in 
the process – could even be described as ‘ethnic cleansing’. This was exactly the of 
view influential sources. The US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, for 
example, was asked by the New York Times whether this was ‘another round of 
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans’. His response was that ‘Ethnic cleansing is 
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something that is organized, and carried out systematically with rape, murder, 
torture, things like that’. But, the Ambassador reportedly maintained, ‘whatever 
blameworthy things the Croatians did – including shunning the last-minute peace 
plan that he brokered and not doing more to persuade the Serbs not to flee – it was 
not that’ (Bonner 1995). There is a kind of grim absurdity in Galbraith’s mild rebuke 
that, by actively burning people out of their houses, the Croats did not do ‘more to 
persuade the Serbs not to flee’. Since the operation was carried out with the approval 
and support of the US, it is perhaps not surprising that the American Ambassador 
would take such a view. Yet British journalists went even further: the Guardian’s 
Martin Woollacott wrote that the attack was ‘to be welcomed’, describing the killing 
and mass expulsion of civilians as ‘a hold on Serbian aggression’ (5 August 1995), 
for example; while the Independent’s editorialist said it was ‘tempting to feel euphoric’ 
(7 August 1995). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Perhaps, as these comments indicate, some journalists felt that they had played a 
part in encouraging a tougher interventionist policy by arguing, like Little (2001), for 
the world to ‘take sides’. By the end of the decade, the full might of NATO was 
aligned with the perspective of advocacy journalists, as the final act of the Yugoslav 
tragedy played out. In coverage of the 1999 Kosovo conflict there was very little sign 
of ‘moral equalisation’ or ‘ethnic war’ framing: to the contrary, NATO bombing was 
explicitly justified in the black-and-white moral terms of halting ‘genocide’ (Hume 
2000).5 Yet the idea that adopting the ‘right’ sort of news framing can trigger such 
armed intervention by placing ‘clear legal duties on Western states…to take 
preventive action’ (Kent 2006: 8) is doubtful. It is noteworthy that in the case of 
Darfur the use of ‘genocide’ framing had no such effect, contrary to the expectations 
of activists who ‘pressured the US government to “call Darfur by its rightful name”: 
genocide’ (Verhoeven et al. 2016: 25). In 2004, both houses of the US Congress 
declared that genocide was happening in Darfur, as did then Secretary of State Colin 
Powell and President George W. Bush. 6  These ringing declarations did not 
precipitate military intervention, but they did lead to a noticeable take up of this 
framing in news reports.7 Rather than the adoption of genocide framing driving 
intervention, it seems more likely that, as Alex de Waal (2007: 8) observes, ‘The 
Congressional and independent activists who campaigned… for the US government 
to declare Darfur “genocide” did so because they wanted an 
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intervention.…Interventionism drove advocacy for the label “genocide” as much as 
vice-versa’. 
 
This is probably the light in which we should understand the view not only of 
‘attached’ journalists, but also that of scholars lamenting that if conflicts are framed in 
the ‘wrong’ way then intervention will not happen. There is indeed much at stake in 
this debate, but the link between news framing and foreign policies is not a causal 
one: rather, it is a question of promoting explanations for conflicts that assert a 
righteous moral stance and legitimise or affirm an interventionist policy orientation. 
What is at stake for the analysis and understanding of the media treatment of conflict 
is whether such position-taking interferes with the critic’s ability to evaluate the 
evidence accurately. In that effort, framing research is a valuable tool, involving as it 
should both quantitative and qualitative analysis, and a sensitivity to contextual 
meanings, including those suggested by influential news sources. 
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Notes 
 
1 Another BBC correspondent, Fergal Keane, described a similar consensus about 
Rwanda around the same time. See: Keane 1995: 6–8. 
 
2 Amanpour worried that ‘In certain situations, the classic definition of objectivity can 
mean neutrality, and neutrality can mean you are an accomplice to all sorts of evil’ 
(quoted in Ricchiardi, 1996), while Bell (1998: 18) admitted that he was ‘no longer 
sure what “objective” means’. 
 
3 The periods sampled were: the week before the onset of hostilities and the 
following three weeks (30 March – 27 April 1992), the same period for 1993 and 
1994, and the three weeks preceding and one week following the ending of the war 
(31 October – 28 November 1995). The most commonly accepted date for the 
beginning of the war is 6 April 1992, when the European Community recognised 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state (see ‘Bosnia War Marks Anniversary’, 
BBC Online, 6 April 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1914133.stm). The war 
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ended on 21 November 1995 when a peace agreement was reached by the main 
parties at Dayton, Ohio. 
 
4 Tutwiler said that: ‘We are concerned about reports that Serb forces…have begun 
to remove non-Serbs in an ethnic, quote, “cleansing”, unquote, operation.’ US 
Federal News Service, State Department Briefing, 14 May 1992. 
 
5 Hume was formerly the editor of LM magazine, which closed after a libel case 
brought against it by ITN News, over the magazine’s questioning of news reports 
drawing parallels between Bosnia and the Holocaust. The original LM article 
(Deichmann 1997) is reproduced at 
www.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/LIE/BOSNIA_PHOTO/bosnia.html. For an 
account of the trial by the magazine’s publisher see Guldberg 2000. 
 
6 See: Charles W. Corey, ‘US Congress Terms Situation in Darfur “Genocide”’, US 
State Department Website, 23 July 2004 
[http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Jul/26-233176.html]; (‘The Crisis in Darfur’ 
(Secretary Powell’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), US State 
Department Website, 9 September 2004 
[http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm]); and ‘President 
and South African President Mbeki Discuss Bilateral Relations’, White House Press 
Release, 1 June 2005 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050601.html]. 
 
7 The number of articles in UK national newspapers mentioning the terms ‘Darfur’ 
and ‘genocide’ rose from 14 in June 2004 to 53 in July, 36 of these 53 articles 
appearing after Congress’s 22 July declaration that genocide was occurring. The 
number of mentions fell again to 29 in August 2004, but rose again to 37 in 
September, following then Secretary of State Colin Powell’s declaration of genocide 
in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 September 2004. 
 
